We look at Russia a hundred years from now!

I almost forgot that there is a tiny bit of Russia on the Baltic Sea... which is cut off from the rest of the country by the E.U./NATO!   

This is the same situation Berlin was in during the 'Cold War!'

ALLAN SAID: Sal, it seems to me that the long-term prospects for Kaliningrad remaining part of Russia seem remote... am I right? 

SAL-9000 SAID: That’s a very interesting and complex question! The long-term status of Kaliningrad as part of Russia is contested, and while “remote” might be a possibility, it's not certain. There are strong counterarguments on both sides. 

I’ll run through major factors that make change possible, (or unlikely) so you can judge how “remote” you think it is.

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What is Kaliningrad

• Kaliningrad Oblast is a Russian exclave, separated from the rest of Russia by other countries (Lithuania and Poland/EU/NATO) after the Cold War/Berlin Wall era reconfiguration. Wikipedia+1

• It was Königsberg, part of East Prussia / Germany pre-1945, then transferred to the USSR and has been Russian-controlled ever since! Wikipedia+2Worldcrunch+2

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Why many think its long-term staying with Russia may be threatened... or at least under pressure!

Here are the main risks:

1. Geopolitical Tension and Isolation:

   • Because it is an exclave, any supply routes (rail, roads) from the main part of Russia must transit through other countries! That creates vulnerability... political conflict... sanctions.... border/transit restrictions... or closure of routes could severely affect Kaliningrad! Wikipedia+1

   • EU/NATO have leverage via sanctions or blocking certain goods in transit. Russia already accuses the West of trying to isolate the oblast. Reuters+2Wikipedia+2

2. Military and Strategic Burden / Risk

   • Kaliningrad is heavily militarized and strategically very important! (missiles, fleet, and forward bases) Maintaining forces and infrastructure there is expensive and difficult... especially under sanctions or conflict. U.S. Naval Institute+2Worldcrunch+2

   • In a conflict scenario, its isolation might become a liability... cutting off reinforcements, supplies, energy, etc! LSM+1

3. Economic, Energy, and Logistical Challenges

   • Kaliningrad doesn’t have full autonomy in energy supply, some materials, etc. Disruption or cost of transit is a practical headache. LSM+2Wikipedia+2

   • Maintaining infrastructure, governance, etc., remains more complicated than contiguous territory.

4. Legal / Diplomatic Claims & International Pressure

   • There have occasionally been suggestions that the region has a “Königsberg question” (although these are mostly theoretical or from fringe groups). Wikipedia+1

   • Treaties (e.g., the “Final Settlement” after WWII) have formally settled German claims in many respects. Any change would involve major international law / treaty breaking or renegotiation. Wikipedia

5. Internal Russian Politics & War Outcomes

   • If Russia as a state weakens significantly—e.g. as a result of war, economic collapse, internal instability—then holding remote or isolated territories becomes harder. The cost of defending them goes up!

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Many think Kaliningrad will remain part of Russia for the foreseeable future!

But “remote” doesn’t mean “inevitable.” 

There are strong counter-factors:

1. Strategic Importance:

   • Kaliningrad is Russia’s gateway to the Baltic, its outpost near the EU and NATO. It allows the reach of its missile systems, naval presence, radar, and surveillance. Giving it up would reduce strategic depth heavily. U.S. Naval Institute+1

   • As long as Russia projects external power, having Kaliningrad is perhaps considered non-negotiable by the Russian leadership.

2. Military & Defensive Investments

   • Russia has heavily militarized the region, and will likely continue to do so, partly to deter Western actions. This acts as both a signal and a practical barrier to any attempt to change its status. LSM+2U.S. Naval Institute+2

3. Russian Domestic Legitimacy

   • Territories lost (especially those perceived as traditionally Russian or Soviet) are politically sensitive in Russia. There is strong domestic resistance to any concessions.

   • The government has strong incentives not to appear weak by giving up territory.

4. Legal/Treaty Frameworks

   • International treaties after WWII, Soviet-era acquisition, post-Soviet law, etc., give Russia a legal claim in most eyes. Reversing that would be very difficult in terms of international law, recognition, and peaceful negotiation.

5. Lack of a clear alternative or compelling cost/benefit for other actors

   • EU/NATO, or other powers, would have to consider the costs of attempting to claim or force status change — diplomatic, military, and economic fallout.

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Scenarios and probabilities

Putting this together: changing ownership/status of Kaliningrad seems low probability in the near term (next 10-20 years) unless there is a major shift, like:

• a collapse or severe weakening of the Russian state.

• a negotiated settlement following a major war that Russia loses or is forced into peace terms unfavourable.

• internal Russian political change toward negotiating border changes.

• EU/NATO or neighbouring states adopt strong positions & have leverage to push change.

In more moderate scenarios, what might happen instead:

• Increased pressure or partial isolation.

• More sanctions, transit disruptions.

• More militarization or countermeasures from both sides.

• More talk and political/diplomatic posturing.

SAL-9000 SAID: How “remote?” Given all this, I’d say that yes, you’re largely right if by “remote” you mean that Kaliningrad is unlikely to cease being part of Russia under normal circumstances in the next few decades! 

It is not impossible, but many significant hurdles stand in the way! 

The “long term” could encompass timescales of many decades, and over that span, more radical change becomes more plausible... but still far from certain!

If you like, I can sketch out a few specific future timelines (say 10, 20, 50 years) with probabilities for different outcomes, (stays Russian, becomes autonomous, reverts to EU control, etc.) to help clarify just how remote... or likely... each scenario might be! 

Do you want me to do that?

ALLAN SAID: What are the chances that Russia will turn around and join the EU? (e.g. After collapse - again!)

SAL-9000 SAID: That’s a bold but fair question. The idea of Russia “turning around” and eventually joining the European Union has been raised at different moments in history... but whether it’s realistic depends on how far into the future we’re looking... and under what conditions! 

Let me break it down into scenarios and likelihoods!

1. Historical Precedent & Missed Windows:

• In the 1990s, after the Soviet collapse, there were discussions (more informal than formal) about integrating Russia more closely with Europe — even joining NATO or building “common spaces” with the EU!

• Those hopes faded quickly due to NATO expansion eastward, Russia’s internal turmoil, and later the consolidation of Putin’s authoritarian model.

• In hindsight, that was the “window” where such integration could have been most possible. 

• Since then, the gap has widened!

2. Barriers Today:

• Political model: The EU requires the rule of law, democracy, a free press, an independent judiciary, and respect for borders! (Today’s Russia is almost the mirror opposite: Authoritarian, centralized, with ongoing wars!)

• Trust deficit: Even after regime change, rebuilding trust would be extremely hard. EU members, such as Poland and the Baltics, have deep-seated security concerns about Russia!

• Economic compatibility: Russia’s economy is resource-export-based, very different from the diversified, service/industry balance of EU economies! 

• Structural reforms would be massive.

• Public opinion: Anti-Western narratives are deeply embedded in Russian state media. Even if a post-collapse leadership were to want EU membership, persuading Russian society might take decades!

3. Conditions That Might Make It Possible:

Russia could realistically pivot toward the EU only under very specific conditions:

Major Internal Collapse or Transition:

- Severe economic collapse, loss of wars, or disintegration of the State, leading to a new government.

- A leadership that chooses democratization, decentralization, and reconciliation with neighbours!

Genuine Democratic Reform:

Abolishing authoritarianism, rebuilding democratic institutions, prosecuting war crimes, and recognizing borders! (Especially Ukraine’s)

EU Strategic Choice:

– The EU would have to decide that anchoring Russia inside European structures is safer than leaving it isolated! 

That’s a huge political risk!

4. Probability Outlook:

Here’s how analysts often frame it:

• Short Term (next 10–20 years): Almost zero! The current regime is entrenched, EU sanctions are hardening, and war in Ukraine makes rapprochement politically toxic!

• Medium Term (20–40 years, post-collapse scenario): Low but not impossible. If Russia faces a deep systemic collapse, similar to the Soviet Union, a reformist government might seek closer ties with the EU. But joining the EU is such a long process (10–15 years minimum, even for smaller, stable countries) that Russia would be looking at decades of transition.

• Long Term (50+ years): Not inconceivable. If Russia undergoes generational change, democratizes, and Europe decides integration is in everyone’s interest, then some form of association [maybe not full membership, but customs union, shared institutions, or something akin to Turkey’s old EU candidacy] could happen!

5. Alternative Futures More Likely Than Full EU Membership:

• Fragmentation: Russia breaks into smaller states; some might integrate with the EU more easily than “Russia” as a whole.

• Neutral Buffer: A post-collapse Russia stabilizes but remains outside EU/NATO, like a larger version of Ukraine’s old “neutrality” posture.

• Chinese Orbit: Russia or its successor state aligns more closely with China economically and politically rather than Europe.

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🔎 Bottom Line:

The chances of Russia as we know it joining the EU are extremely slim in the short and medium term. The only plausible pathway is after a major internal collapse and democratization — and even then, it would be a decades-long project with many obstacles! 

It’s more likely Russia ends up fragmented, neutral, or oriented toward Asia than inside the EU... though “never” is too strong a word when we’re thinking 50–100 years out!

SAL 9000-SAID: Do you want me to sketch probability estimates in percentages for different scenarios (EU membership, fragmentation, Chinese orbit, authoritarian continuity) so you can see the comparative likelihoods over time?

ALLAN SAID: YES!

SAL 9000-SAID: Alright, Allan — let me map this out in a clear scenario table, with approximate probability estimates. Think of these not as exact numbers, but as reasoned ranges based on history, geopolitics, and current trends.

Russia’s Long-Term Futures: (EU Membership vs Alternatives)

Short Term: (Next 10–20 Years)

• Authoritarian Continuity (Putin or successor regime, anti-Western, militarized): ~70%

• Collapse/Chaos (internal instability, regime fall, but no EU integration yet): ~20%

• EU Membership Pathway (begins reform, talks about association): <2%

• Chinese Orbit (tightened dependence on China, de facto client state): ~8%

👉 In the short run, EU membership is almost off the table. Collapse is possible, but chaos is likelier than clean integration!

Medium Term: (20–40 Years)

• Authoritarian Continuity (new regime but same model): ~40%

• Collapse & Fragmentation (breakup into regions, e.g. Siberia/Urals/Far East vs European Russia): ~25%

• Chinese Orbit (long-term dependency): ~20%

• EU Membership (after collapse, democratization, decades of reform): ~15%

👉 Here the EU option grows — but only if Russia undergoes another collapse and deep reform! 

Fragmentation becomes a serious possibility!

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Long Term (40–70+ Years)

• EU Membership / Deep Integration with Europe (full or partial, e.g. customs union, European Economic Area): ~30%

• Fragmentation into Smaller States (some join EU, some go neutral, some drift toward China): ~30%

• Chinese Orbit (Russia or successor state tightly tied to Beijing): ~25%

• Authoritarian Continuity (a “neo-Russia” clinging to the same model): ~15%

👉 In the very long run, all outcomes are open. EU membership becomes more plausible, (a third chance) ...but so does permanent fragmentation.

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⚖️ Takeaway

• Short term (to 2045): EU membership chances are close to zero.

• Medium term (to 2065): Possible but still a minority scenario.

• Long term (2100 horizon): A third chance — but equally likely Russia splits or orients toward China.

The decisive variables will be:

1. Will Russia collapse again? (Like the USSR in 1991)

2. Does a reformist leadership emerge? (Willing to democratize & reconcile with Europe)

3. Does the EU want Russia inside? (Security fears may block it even if Russia changes)

SAL-9000 SAID: Would you like me to make a visual timeline diagram (like a probability tree or bar chart) showing how these scenarios diverge over time? 

That might make the comparison clearer!

ALLAN SAID: Yes!

SAL-9000 SAID: Possible Futures for Russia (Probabilities Over Time)

Here’s the visual timeline! 

It shows how different futures for Russia evolve over time:

* Yellow (EU Membership Path): Almost negligible now, but climbs to a real possibility (about a third chance) by the late century.

* Green (Chinese Orbit): Increases over time, reflecting deepening  ties with Beijing.

* Blue (Authoritarian Continuity): Dominant short-term but shrinks in the long run! 

*  Orange    (Collapse/Fragmentation): Grows steadily, peaking in the long run.

SAL-9000 SAID: Would you like me to also prepare a probability tree diagram, (branching from collapse vs continuity into different outcomes) so you can see the causal paths rather than just the timeline? 

ALLAN SAID: Yes!

SAL-9000 SAID: Russia’s Future Scenarios: Probability Tree!

Here’s the probability tree view:

• Russia today branches mostly into Authoritarian Continuity, Collapse/Instability, Chinese Orbit, and a small chance of an EU Pathway.

• From Collapse, you get two diverging futures: Fragmentation or Reform & EU Membership Path.

• Authoritarian Continuity can extend, but often ends in Delayed Collapse, which then feeds back into the other scenarios!

• Chinese Orbit tends to lock into Deep Dependence!

• The EU Pathway, though tiny at first, can eventually lead to Full Integration if conditions line up!

(The kicker is that the world will eventually (100+ years) be divided into multiple "Zones of Interest"  (North America, South America, Europe/Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia, West Asia. Oceana. and Australia/New Zealand)   ...and it would be to Russia's advantage to be a part of the Euro-Centric Zone!)

This shows not just the probabilities... but also the causal routes that would have to happen for Russia to ever join the EU.

SAL-9000 SAID:Do you want me to refine this tree into a clean infographic-style chart (rectangular boxes, colour-coded branches, and clearer probability ranges) that you could drop straight into a blog or presentation? 

ALLAN SAID: Yes!

SAL-9000 SAID: Russia’s Long-Term Futures: Probability Tree Infographic

Here’s the cleaned-up infographic-style probability tree:

• Russia Today splits into four main futures:

  • Authoritarian Continuity (70%) → leads to Neo-Authoritarian Russia or eventual Delayed Collapse.

  • Collapse/Instability (20%) → branches toward Fragmentation (25%) or Reform & EU Path. (15%)

  • Chinese Orbit (8%) → deepens into Dependence. (25%)

  • EU Pathway (2%) → rare, but can progress to Full EU Integration. (30%)

It’s structured so you can visually see how only certain collapse + reform paths eventually make EU membership plausible, while most other paths loop into authoritarianism... fragmentation... or Chinese alignment!

SAL-9000 SAID: Would you like me to colour-code the outcomes (e.g., red = authoritarian, green = EU, yellow = collapse / fragmentation, blue = China) so that it’s instantly readable at a glance? 

ALLAN SAID: Yes!

SAL-9000 SAID: Russia’s Long-Term Futures: 

Here’s the color-coded probability tree for Russia’s futures:

• 🔴 Red = Authoritarian Continuity → present model, possibly morphing into a new “neo-authoritarian” state.

• 🟡 Yellow = Collapse/Fragmentation → instability, potential breakup, or reconfiguration.

• 🔵 Blue = Chinese Orbit → gradual deep dependence on Beijing.

• 🟢 Green = EU Path → the rare reformist track that could lead to eventual EU integration.

• ⚪ Gray = Neutral Starting Point → Russia today.

Authoritarian Russia(15%) Collapse/Fragmentation(25%) EU Membership(30%) Chinese Dependant(20%)

This way, you can instantly see the dominant authoritarian track in the short term, the rising collapse/fragmentation risks, and the narrow but growing EU pathway.

OR...

Putin's ultimate goal is to take over / control from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad!

And then Belarus and Ukraine should be thrown in too!!

♫ First we take Manhattan... and then we take Berlin ♫

Here's one Canadian solution that will help things along!!!

I was curious to see if anybody would take my suggestion to only buy the first batch of F-35s from the States... ["That we already paid for!"]  ...then we could look around for something that was better [And cheaper] for Canada!

So, I asked the Perspective Research Department's A.I. SAL-9000: (HAL-9000's Twin... Along with CAL-9000!)

Sal: Which is better for Canada... Gripen E-series jets, the Dassault Rafale, or the Eurofighter Typhoon?

SAL said:

Certainly, Allan. Here's a comprehensive three-way comparison of the Saab Gripen E, Dassault Rafale, and Eurofighter Typhoon, specifically tailored to Canada's defense, financial, industrial, and political needs in 2025. I’ve broken this down by major factors that Canada must consider when selecting a fighter platform.

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🇨🇦 Canada's Needs Summary

Before diving in, let’s remind ourselves of Canada's unique defense profile:

• NORAD obligations require long-range patrol and interoperability with the U.S.

• NATO commitments require multirole flexibility and combat-readiness.

• Sovereignty enforcement over vast Arctic and maritime zones.

• Budget sensitivity and industrial offsets (jobs, tech transfer).

• Desire to reduce U.S. dependency under current trade/political strains.

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✈️ Overview of the Jets

Jet	Origin		Cost	Multirole?	NATO-Interoperable?
Saab Gripen E	Sweden		$85–95M CAD	Yes	Fully NATO-capable
Dassault Rafale F4	France		$100–120M CAD	Yes	Yes
Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 4/5	Germany/UK/Italy/Spain		$130–150M CAD	Yes	Yes

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🔧 1. Operational Capabilities

Category	Gripen E	Rafale F4	Eurofighter Typhoon T4/5
Range (combat)	~1,500 km	~1,800 km	~1,390 km
Max Speed	Mach 2	Mach 1.8	Mach 2
Payload	7.2 tons	9.5 tons	9.0 tons
Radar	AESA (Raven ES-05) + IRST	AESA (RBE2-AA) + IRST	AESA (Captor-E) + IRST
Stealth / RCS	Low RCS, small frame	Moderate stealth	Larger RCS, no stealth shaping
Suitability for Arctic Ops	Excellent	Good	Moderate (cold weather upgrades exist but limited field use)

➡️ Verdict: Gripen E is ideal for cold-weather, dispersed operations. Rafale leads in payload and versatility. Typhoon is the fastest but was originally designed for air dominance, not strike flexibility (improved since Tranche 3/4).

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🛠️ 2. Industrial Benefits to Canada

Category	Gripen E	Rafale	Eurofighter
Tech Transfer	High – Sweden offers full IP transfer	Medium – France offers partial transfer	Low – Euro consortium unlikely to share deep tech
Domestic Assembly	Possible (Brazil & Czech deals had local assembly)	Limited – Dassault resists foreign assembly	Unlikely – complex supply chain across Europe
Canadian Jobs Potential	High – Saab committed to local production	Medium – Dassault offers offsets	Low – Mostly European jobs
Export Collaboration	Yes (Saab promotes joint export deals)	Possible, but France retains control	No – tight European export control

➡️ Verdict: Gripen E is the best option if Canada wants domestic production and long-term tech independence. The Rafale is decent but more centralized. Eurofighter is European-centric and less flexible industrially.

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💰 3. Cost and Logistics

Category	Gripen E	Rafale	Typhoon
Acquisition Cost (fleet of 88)	~$8–9B CAD	~$10–11B CAD	~$12–13B CAD
Operating Cost/hr	~$7,500 CAD	~$17,000 CAD	~$20,000+ CAD
Maintenance Footprint	Low (single engine, modular design)	Medium (twin-engine, complex avionics)	High (expensive parts, complex logistics)
Lifecycle Cost (30 years)	Lowest	Mid	Highest

➡️ Verdict: Gripen E wins on affordability and ease of maintenance. Rafale is acceptable but costly. Typhoon is expensive both upfront and over time.

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🌐 4. Geopolitical and Strategic Fit

Factor	Gripen E	Rafale	Typhoon
U.S. Independence	High	High	Medium (UK is a U.S. ally)
Five Eyes Compatibility	Medium – improving	Medium – independent systems	High – UK is Five Eyes
NATO Interoperability	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Export Freedom	High – Sweden rarely restricts buyers	High – France acts independently	Medium – EU consortium restrictions
Diplomatic Leverage	Moderate	High (France is assertive)	Complicated (multi-country consortium)

➡️ Verdict: Rafale and Gripen give Canada independent leverage. Typhoon is too politically entangled for a truly sovereign Canadian procurement.

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🧩 5. Integration and Future-Proofing

Factor	Gripen E	Rafale F4	Typhoon T4/T5
Open Architecture	Yes – easy to integrate 3rd party systems	Somewhat open	Closed – heavily Euro-standardized
AI/Autonomy Features	Yes (future-proofed for drone teaming)	Yes (F5 roadmap)	Improving with Project Centurion, but slower
Sensor Fusion	Very good	Excellent	Good
NATO Data Link / Interop	Full	Full	Full
Upgrades Timeline	Rapid (Saab has agile dev cycles)	On track for F5	Slow – needs consortium approval

➡️ Verdict: Gripen offers flexibility and agility. Rafale is well-integrated but slower to adapt. Typhoon suffers from bureaucratic inertia.

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🏁 Final Summary and Recommendation for Canada

Criteria	Best Choice
Cost	Gripen E
Industrial Benefits	Gripen E
Multirole Combat Performance	Rafale
Range and Payload	Rafale
Sovereignty / Arctic Ops	Gripen E
Future Growth / Modularity	Gripen E
Political Independence	Tie: Gripen / Rafale
Ease of Integration into NORAD/NATO	Rafale / Typhoon

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🏆 RECOMMENDED RANKING:

1. 🇸🇪 Saab Gripen E – Best for sovereignty, cost-efficiency, cold-weather readiness, and local industrial impact. A pragmatic choice for an independent and cost-sensitive Canada.

2. 🇫🇷 Dassault Rafale F4 – Excellent multirole capabilities and combat range, but costlier with fewer industrial concessions. Strong option if performance trumps price.

3. 🇪🇺 Eurofighter Typhoon – Advanced but expensive and politically complicated. Less suitable for Canada's independent defense and industrial goals.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 15, 2025

Government Defence Review Recommends Saab Gripen E as Canada’s Next-Generation Fighter Jet

Ottawa, ON — Following a comprehensive defence capability review, Canada is poised to recommend the Saab Gripen E multirole fighter aircraft as the most strategic and cost-effective solution to replace the country’s aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets.

The review, conducted by independent defence analysts and experts in Arctic security, NORAD interoperability, and industrial policy, evaluated two leading contenders: the Saab Gripen E (Sweden) and the Dassault Rafale (France). 

The Gripen E emerged as the top recommendation for Canada’s evolving defence priorities!

“This aircraft is a perfect match for Canada’s operational environment, fiscal framework, and industrial ambitions,” the report states. “The Gripen E will strengthen our Arctic sovereignty, enhance NORAD integration, and bring high-value aerospace jobs back to Canadian soil.”

Key Highlights of the Recommendation:

Arctic-Ready: Designed for extreme weather, the Gripen E offers unmatched performance in northern environments—critical for Canadian sovereignty operations.

Interoperability: Fully compatible with NATO and NORAD systems, ensuring seamless collaboration with allies, especially the United States.

Economic Benefits: Saab has offered extensive technology transfer and the potential for domestic assembly, fueling Canada’s defense manufacturing sector.

Cost Efficiency: With one of the lowest operating costs among Western fighters (~$7,000/hour), the Gripen E allows Canada to sustain a full fighter fleet without burdening future defense budgets.

Strategic Shift Toward Sovereignty and Sustainability.

This recommendation marks a strategic shift away from reliance on expensive, high-maintenance platforms and toward agile, affordable, and sovereign defence capabilities. 

In a time of increasing global instability and Arctic competition, the Gripen E offers Canada independence, security, and control over its skies. “Canada must be prepared for tomorrow’s threats, not yesterday’s battles,” said one defense analyst close to the review. “The Gripen is the smart fighter for a smarter defence policy.”

Next Steps:

The final decision on procurement remains with the federal cabinet, which is expected to deliberate in the coming weeks. 

If approved, Canada could move quickly toward formal negotiations with Saab, potentially establishing Canadian assembly lines and long-term support infrastructure.

For media inquiries, interviews, or a full copy of the recommendation report, contact:

Media Relations – Department of National Defence

📞 1-800-DEFENCE

✉️ media@forces.gc.ca

🌐 www.canada.ca/defence