Canada’s “Buy Canadian” Defence Push: What It Could Mean for Building Saab Gripen E Fighters in Canada.
Canada’s military and government are signalling a stronger preference for Canadian industrial content in future procurement. That shift could materially affect any renewed debate about domestic production of the Saab Gripen E.
Why “Buy Canadian” Is Back on the Table.
In plain terms, “Buy Canadian” defence procurement is about keeping more of Canada’s defence dollars inside Canada. The logic is straightforward: stronger domestic supply chains, more skilled jobs, and greater resilience if international politics or exports disrupt access to parts and support.
In practice, this usually means favouring bids that deliver:
- Canadian final assembly (or major sub-assembly) rather than simple subcontracting.
- Canadian supplier networks that can deliver components and services over decades.
- Technology transfer. (So Canada isn’t locked into foreign-only upgrades)
- In-country maintenance and lifecycle support (MRO) to reduce strategic dependence.
If Ottawa becomes more serious about enforcing these goals, it will influence which aircraft programs are politically and economically attractive... especially on big-ticket platforms like fighters.
How This Connects to the Saab Gripen E Proposal.
Saab’s long-standing Canadian pitch has been built around industrial participation and domestic production options. A “Buy Canadian” shift tends to favour bids that can credibly deliver Canadian assembly, Canadian suppliers, and Canadian maintenance capacity.
That is why “Buy Canadian” messaging... if it becomes policy rather than rhetoric... could make a Canadian Gripen line more plausible, particularly if paired with a broader Canadian aerospace strategy! (training pipelines, export ambitions, and long-term maintenance hubs)
What Would Have to Be True for Gripens to Be Built in Canada.
A key reality: No company builds a major fighter assembly line without a committed order. If Canada were to pursue a Gripen option (either as a full replacement or as part of a mixed fleet), Ottawa would have to structure the deal to make domestic production unavoidable... not optional.
In practical terms, a Canada-built Gripen outcome would likely require:
- A multi-decade order size large enough to justify a Canadian line.
- Guaranteed Canadian content thresholds. (parts, labour, sustainment, upgrades)
- Contract language that binds the production plan to milestones.
- Clear sustainment commitments so Canada controls maintenance and availability.
The Catch: U.S. Components and NORAD Reality.
Even “built in Canada” does not automatically mean “independent of U.S. approvals.” Modern fighters typically rely on a multinational supply chain. If a platform includes U.S.-origin components (engines, sensors, avionics, weapons interfaces), U.S. export rules may still apply.
There’s also the strategic environment: Canada’s fighter force must remain highly interoperable with the United States for NORAD and broader allied operations. That requirement tends to favour platforms deeply embedded in U.S. and NATO systems.
This is why some Canadian defence debates drift toward a mixed fleet concept: maintain a core capability aligned to allied expeditionary operations, while also building an Arctic-focused force with maximum Canadian industrial participation.
Three Plausible Outcomes.
1) All F-35. (Simplest, But Less Canadian Industry)
If Canada commits fully to one platform already anchored in U.S.-led supply chains, Canada can still gain subcontract work, but final assembly and full sovereignty over sustainment are harder to guarantee.
2) Mixed Fleet. (Most Politically and Industrially “Balanced”)
A mixed fleet approach could allow Ottawa to keep strong interoperability and still secure domestic production and sustainment work on a second platform. If “Buy Canadian” becomes a serious priority, this scenario becomes more attractive.
3) All Gripen. (Maximum Industrial Benefit, Highest Political Friction)
A Canada-built Gripen fleet could maximize Canadian industrial participation, but it would face heavier scrutiny on interoperability, U.S. component exposure, and long-term political sustainability.
Bottom Line.
If Canada’s defence establishment truly prioritizes domestic content, it naturally increases pressure to choose procurement paths that create real Canadian production and sustainment capacity. That dynamic makes the idea of building Saab Gripen E fighters in Canada more plausible—but only if Canada is willing to structure an order large enough, strict enough, and long enough to force the outcome.
If Ottawa wants sovereignty, it has to buy sovereignty—on paper, in contract clauses, and in actual industrial infrastructure.
