Sunday Morning Funnies: Oh shit!

Now more than halfway to the moon, the Artemis II astronauts prepared for their historic lunar fly-around to push deeper into space than even the Apollo astronauts!

On the downside, their toilet is on the blink again! (Until the Orion capsule's bathroom is fixed, mission control has instructed the astronauts to break out more backup urine-collection bags!) 

The so-called lunar loo malfunctioned following Wednesday's liftoff and has been hit-and-miss ever since!

A version of the Artemis II toilet was tested on the International Space Station several years ago, and NASA has now contacted Howard Wolowitz (who originally designed the toilet) to provide fresh insight into possible fixes! (He is an aerospace engineer at Caltech's Department of Applied Physics.) 

(Howard and a few friends watching the Artemis II launch!)

True North Strong and Free!

Canada Gripen Ecosystem Map: Production Nodes, Supply Flows, and Arctic Deployment Arcs

A clean strategic concept for how Canada could organize a domestic Gripen ecosystem!

If Canada ever chose to pursue a serious domestic Saab Gripen ecosystem, the most realistic model would not revolve around repurposing an automotive plant. It would instead build on the aerospace infrastructure Canada already has. That means a distributed national network centered on Montreal-Mirabel, supported by Winnipeg, linked through a sustainment chain, and justified strategically by Arctic deployment.

1. The Industrial Core: Montreal-Mirabel

The heart of any credible Canadian Gripen production system would be the Montreal-Mirabel aerospace corridor. This is where Canada already has the deepest concentration of aircraft manufacturing, simulation, engineering, propulsion support, and systems integration capability.

In practical terms, Montreal-Mirabel would serve as the country’s primary integration and systems hub. Final aircraft integration, engineering coordination, mission systems work, simulator development, and specialized subassemblies would logically be anchored here.

If the aircraft were ever assembled in Canada at scale, Mirabel would be the most natural location for final aerospace integration. It already fits the logic of aircraft production far better than a repurposed auto facility.

2. The Structural Backbone: Winnipeg

A second major node would be Winnipeg, which would function as the structural backbone of the system. This is where composite structures, precision aerostructures, and machined components would most logically be concentrated.

In a national Gripen ecosystem, Winnipeg’s role would be straightforward: feed the main integration hub with the physical airframe components that make the aircraft possible.

3. Supply Flows: The Industrial Arteries

A clean strategic map should also show the movement of materials and systems between these nodes. The most important internal flow would run from Winnipeg east to Montreal-Mirabel, representing the movement of composite structures and major airframe sections.

That arrow is important because it captures the basic industrial logic of the ecosystem: structure is built in one node, while final integration and systems work happen in another.

A second supply flow would show engine systems entering Canada from abroad. Whether the aircraft remained powered by the U.S.-built F414 or moved one day toward a Rolls-Royce or Eurojet-related alternative, the propulsion chain would still remain the most obvious external dependency.

4. Sustainment Network: Long-Term Control

The real strength of a Canadian fighter ecosystem would not just be the assembly line. It would be the sustainment network behind it. Aircraft remain sovereign only if a country can maintain, upgrade, repair, and support them over decades.

This layer matters because it is what turns a one-time industrial project into a lasting strategic capability.

5. Operational Fighter Bases

Any realistic map should mark CFB Cold Lake and CFB Bagotville as the two principal fighter deployment bases in the system. These would serve as the main operational anchors for a Canadian Gripen force.

On the map, these should be shown with clear airbase icons rather than generic dots. They are not just support locations. They are where the aircraft would actually be based, maintained in operational form, and launched for sovereignty patrols or interceptions.

6. Arctic Deployment Arcs: The Strategic Purpose

The most important visual element on the map would be the Arctic deployment arcs. These are what explain why the system exists in the first place.

A western arc should extend from Cold Lake to Inuvik and out toward the Beaufort Sea. An eastern arc should run from Bagotville to Iqaluit and onward toward Baffin Bay and the Greenland corridor.

These arcs should be curved and semi-transparent, showing patrol reach rather than fixed routes. They represent the strategic logic of the aircraft: northern sovereignty, interception capability, and the ability to project presence into Canada’s Arctic approaches.

7. Northern Support Layer

Forward operating points such as Inuvik, Iqaluit, and Nanisivik should appear as smaller northern markers. These locations would not replace the main fighter bases, but they would extend operational reach and support Arctic patrol operations.

This northern layer is what transforms a southern aerospace-industrial network into a true national defence architecture.

8. Why This Map Matters

The value of this concept is that it does not rely on fantasy infrastructure. It uses what Canada already has. It also shows that a fighter-industrial system would not be concentrated in one plant or one province. It would be distributed across multiple regions, each serving a specific function.

The map tells a simple story:

• Montreal-Mirabel anchors the aerospace brain of the system.
• Winnipeg feeds the structural side of production.
• The sustainment network provides long-term operational control.
• The Arctic deployment arcs define the national mission.

In short, this is not only a production map. It is a map of industrial sovereignty tied directly to Arctic strategy.

Conclusion

Once CAMI is removed from the equation, the concept becomes cleaner and more realistic. Canada already possesses much of the aerospace base required to support a Gripen ecosystem. The real issue is not whether the country has the industrial nodes. It is whether it has the political will to connect them into a coherent national project.

The one major external choke point remains engine sovereignty. But apart from that, a distributed Canadian Gripen network built around Montreal-Mirabel, Winnipeg, the national sustainment chain, and Arctic deployment arcs is a plausible strategic model.

This is Canada after Greenland and the American states of Alaska and Maine decide it's to their advantage to be a part of the Canadian defence umbrella! 

And Canada itself... remember... free health care... etc!!

Sunday Series: #1. Canada, True North Strong and Free!

***

Aviation Lovers is in Toronto!

The comparison between the top speeds of the Saab Gripen E and the Lockheed Martin F-35 highlights a fundamental difference in design philosophy. 

The Gripen E is a Mach 2.0 aircraft, capable of reaching speeds of approximately 2,450 km/h at altitude. 

In contrast, the F-35 is rated at Mach 1.6, or about 1,960 km/h. 

When you do the math, the Gripen’s top speed is exactly 1.25 times faster than that of the F-35 ($1.6 \times 1.25 = 2.0$). 

This "speed gap" is not an accident; while the F-35 was designed to prioritize low-observable stealth and sensor fusion, often trading raw speed for a smaller radar cross-section, the Gripen was engineered as a high-speed, agile interceptor capable of rapid response and "supercruise" (sustaining supersonic flight without using fuel-heavy afterburners).

For a country like Canada, this 25% speed advantage has practical implications for Arctic sovereignty. In the vast, open stretches of the North, the ability to close the distance to an unidentified aircraft quickly is a vital part of the "interception" mission that the Avro Arrow was originally built for. 

While the F-35 relies on being a "silent killer" that enemies never see coming, the Gripen E uses its superior kinematic performance and Mach 2.0 dash speed to reach a target area faster. 

This makes the Gripen a spiritual successor to the high-speed doctrine of the 1950s, providing the "sprint" capability necessary to police the world’s second-largest airspace effectively.

Sunday Morning News!

From Sea... to Sea... to Sea!

ALLAN SAID: Sal, assuming that Churchill could become an Arctic port for Canada... what is the percentage of ice cover on Hudson Bay and the strait between Canada and Greenland during the winter... and for how much of the winter could it remain passable with icebreakers, etc.?

SAL SAID: Here’s the real-world, operational picture... not theory... of Hudson Bay and the Greenland - Canada gateway (Hudson Strait / Davis Strait) in winter.

***

🧊 1. Hudson Bay — Winter Ice Coverage.

Ice coverage:

• Near 100% coverage by mid–late winter. (Jan–March)

• Essentially a continuous ice sheet, with only small cracks/leads.

• Annual range: 0% (summer) → ~95–100% (winter) 

👉 In practical terms:

It behaves like a frozen inland sea, not a navigable ocean.

***

Ice thickness

• Typical winter thickness:

  • 1–1.5 meters (3–5 ft) 

• Can be thicker in ridged areas

Navigation reality

• Normal ships: impossible

• Icebreakers: technically possible but difficult.

Key constraint:

• Ice is “land-fast” and consolidated, meaning it doesn’t drift easily.

• Pressure ridges can stop even strong icebreakers.

***

Passability window. (Hudson Bay)

• December: Freeze-up. (unreliable navigation) 

• January–March: Fully frozen → ❌ essentially closed.

• April–May: Still heavy ice, limited escorted movement.

• June–November: Open season. (current shipping reality)

👉 Bottom line:

• 0–10% of winter is realistically passable, and only with heavy icebreaker escort

• Even then, slow, risky, and expensive.

• ***

🌊 2. Hudson Strait / Greenland–Canada Gap.

(Your critical choke point between Canada and Greenland.)

Ice coverage:

• Not fully solid like Hudson Bay.

• Typically: 70–90% ice concentration in winter.

  • More dynamic, drifting pack ice.

• Mix of:

  • - First-year ice.

  • - Moving floes.

  • - Open leads. (important for navigation)

Ice thickness

• Typically:

  • 0.5–1.25 meters average. 

• Thicker near Baffin Island / western side.

Navigation reality!

This is the key difference:

👉 Unlike Hudson Bay:

• The Strait is partially navigable in winter.

• Why?

• Strong currents + tides keep leads and polynyas open.

• Ice is mobile, not locked in place.

Passability window. (Hudson Strait / Davis Strait)

• Year-round navigation possible with icebreakers.

• Winter conditions:

  • Heavy escort required.

  • Slow speeds.

  • Routing through leads.

  • 👉 Practical estimate:

• 50–80% of winter: passable. (with icebreaker support)

• 0% without ice-class vessels.

⚖️ Strategic Interpretation. (Churchill Port Reality.)

***

The bottleneck is NOT the Strait.

• Hudson Strait = manageable with infrastructure.

• Comparable to Baltic winter shipping.

The bottleneck IS Hudson Bay..........

• Fully frozen, static ice field.

• Requires:

  • Constant heavy icebreaking.

  • Possibly multiple escort corridors.

  • ***

🧠 Bottom-Line Numbers (What You Asked For)

Region.	Winter Ice Cover	Passable with Icebreakers
Hudson Bay.	~95–100%	~0–10% (very limited)
Hudson Strait / Greenland gap.	~70–90%	~50–80% (with escort)

***

🔧 What This Means for a “3rd Coast” Port!

For Churchill to work year-round, Canada would need:

1. Permanent heavy icebreaker fleet. (Not current capability!)

2. Maintained shipping lanes across Hudson Bay.

3. Possibly:

• Nuclear or very high-powered icebreakers. (Russian model)

• Ice routing + satellite guidance systems.

4. ***

🚨 Strategic Insight. (This is the key point)

• The Arctic isn’t “blocked”…

• It’s conditionally accessible.

👉 The Strait is solvable.

👉 Hudson Bay is the true barrier.

If you want next step, Allan:

I can overlay this with your Arctic defence map and show exactly where icebreaking corridors + naval bases would need to go to make Churchill viable year-round.

***

ALLAN SAID: Show exactly where icebreaking corridors + naval bases would need to go to make Churchill viable for at least 6 and possibly 8 months of the year... and would the port still be viable?

SAL-9000 SAID: Yes — Churchill could be made viable for roughly 6 months, but 8 months starts to become a major national icebreaking project, not just a port upgrade!

The core issue is that Hudson Strait is the easier part; Hudson Bay itself is the hard part, because it consolidates much more heavily as winter sets in. 

Current official guidance still places ordinary navigation to Churchill in a narrow summer-fall window, with non-ice-strengthened access generally feasible from about the last week of July and latest departure around the second half of October... while regional ice summaries show Hudson Strait’s median shipping season extending roughly late June to end December... and Hudson Bay’s only early July to mid-November! (Or early December, depending on the area.) 

Canada’s Coast Guard also states its Arctic icebreaker operations are concentrated mainly from June to November, which tells you the present system is not set up for sustained deep-winter Hudson Bay escorting. 

My bottom line:

A 6-month operating target is realistic only with substantial new support. 

An 8-month target is possible in principle, but would likely require a near-continuous escorted corridor, stronger port breakout capability at Churchill, and a much larger dedicated icebreaking posture than Canada currently fields. 

That is also consistent with current public planning around Churchill, which is still in the stage of studying what extended or year-round shipping would require. 

***

Where the icebreaking corridors would need to go!

These are the three corridors that matter. 

This is a strategic-operational layout, not a mariner’s navigation instruction.

***

Corridor 1: Outer gateway corridor!

From the Labrador Sea / southern Davis Strait north-westward into the Davis Strait approaches.

Purpose: Stage ships before they enter the more constrained ice regime farther west; give icebreakers room to organize convoy timing and routing around ice and iceberg conditions in Davis Strait. Davis Strait remains seasonally dynamic rather than fully locked, and Canada publishes dedicated daily ice charts for it because it is an operational gateway. 

Corridor 2: Main transit corridor through Hudson Strait!

Run the escorted lane through Hudson Strait, favoring the north side / flaw-lead side where persistent leads often form. 

Environment and Climate Change Canada’s Hudson Bay/Northern Labrador regional summary notes that a shore or flaw lead is frequently present on the north side of the Strait, and research literature describes the Hudson Strait as the one part of the Canadian Arctic where winter shipping does take place because currents and tides keep the ice mobile. 

Corridor 3: Hudson Bay westbound access lane to Churchill!

After clearing the Hudson Strait, the critical lane runs west-southwest across Hudson Bay to Churchill. 

This is the expensive part! 

In early and late shoulder seasons, an escorted route is plausible! (By deeper winter, maintaining this as a reliable commercial lane becomes much harder because Hudson Bay develops broad first-year ice cover and more consolidated conditions!) 

That is why the present practical Churchill season remains much shorter than Hudson Strait’s. 

***

Where the naval and support bases would need to go...

To make Churchill viable for 6 to 8 months, I would place the support system in layers:

1. Churchill itself... primary western terminal and winter harbour breakout point.

Churchill would need more than a port expansion. It would need:

• - Dedicated harbour breakout capability.

• - Likely a seasonal forward icebreaker berth or support detachment.

• - Tug, salvage, fuel, repair, and emergency response capacity.

• - Better all-weather rail and landside reliability.

• 
  

Churchill is already the western endpoint, so this is non-negotiable. 

Current government and AGG planning around “Port of Churchill Plus” and year-round shipping studies already point toward rail, road, port and icebreaking as a combined system, not a port-only fix. 

2. Eastern Hudson Strait support base — ideally, Iqaluit area.

For a corridor to work, you need a forward eastern support node near the entrance to the Hudson Strait.

Why Iqaluit? It sits near the eastern Arctic air/sea support network and is better positioned than Churchill to support the Strait end of the route. 

It would be the logical place for:

• -patrol aircraft support.

• -search and rescue.

• -route reconnaissance.

• -emergency diversion.

• -naval logistics support for Strait operations.

• 
  

3. Southern Davis Strait / Labrador support node.

A support node on the Labrador side gives you:

• -Deep-water staging before the convoy enters the Strait system.

• -Iceberg and ice intelligence.

• -Backup SAR and towing support.

• -Fuel and maintenance support for escorts.

• 
  

Operationally, this is the “Atlantic-side handshake” that links Churchill traffic to the broader North Atlantic network.

4. Optional mid-route seasonal support site in Hudson Strait / Ungava side.

Not a full naval base... more a seasonal logistics / helicopter / drone / emergency refuge node.

This would improve:

• -ice reconnaissance.

• -medevac reach.

• -response time if a convoy is delayed or beset.

Without something like this, your whole system is stretched over too much distance.

***

The simplest “corridor + base” layout.

If you picture the route on a map, it is basically:

Atlantic / Labrador support node: 

1. → Davis Strait escort assembly area.

2. → north-side Hudson Strait escorted lane.

3. → mid-route support / SAR node.

4. → Hudson Bay escorted westbound lane.

→ Churchill breakout and terminal operations.

That is the shortest answer to “exactly where.”

Would the port still be viable?

For 6 months: Yes, if the cargo base is strong enough! (Minerals, rare earths, uranium, potash, oil, LNG.)

A 6-month season is close enough to the upper end of today’s broader regional ice windows that it could make commercial sense for bulk exports, especially if Churchill continues positioning itself as a shorter route from the Prairies to Europe. 

That matches current government and AGG interest in strengthening the corridor for grain, potash, mining, energy and critical materials. 

***

For 8 months: maybe, but only under strict conditions.

At 8 months, you are no longer just “extending the season.” 

You are effectively creating a managed Arctic marine corridor. 

Viability would depend on all of these being true:

• -dependable cargo volumes.

• -dedicated heavy icebreakers.

• -fixed convoy scheduling.

• -reliable insurance terms.

• -high-quality ice intelligence and routing.

• -major port, rail, and emergency-response upgrades.

If even one of those is weak, costs rise fast!

My practical judgment:

I would rank it like this:

6 months:

Commercially plausible with big investment.

This is the most realistic serious target!

7 months:

Possible, but starts to require a more permanent escort system.

8 months:

Technically conceivable, but probably only viable for selected cargoes and only with a national-strategic commitment, not just ordinary port economics!

So: yes, Churchill could still be viable... but mainly as a strategic seasonal-to-extended-season port, not yet as an easy year-round commercial equivalent of Halifax or Vancouver! (The closer you push toward 8 months, the more the project stops being “just a port” and becomes a national Arctic corridor program!)

I can turn this into a clean Canada map next, with the three icebreaking corridors and the exact base locations marked.

***

ALLAN SAID: Yes, but first tell me if large oil tankers and LNG ships would be viable for at least 6 months of the year because they seem to be the most profitable!

SAL-9000 SAID: Allan... Short answer: Yes—for ~6 months, large oil tankers and LNG carriers could be viable… but only under specific conditions.

Not “normal shipping” this would be ice-class, escorted, infrastructure-heavy operations.

Let’s break it down cleanly.

🚢 1. Oil Tankers (Crude / Product)

4

✔️ Feasibility (6 months)

• Yes... technically and commercially plausible.

• Already proven globally. (e.g., Arctic Russia routes)

Required conditions:

• -Ice-class tankers. (Arc4–Arc7 equivalent)

• -Icebreaker escort during shoulder months. (Nov, May, June)

• -Reinforced hull + propulsion systems.

Operating window (Churchill scenario)

• -July → December = viable.

• Peak efficiency:

  • -August–October. (minimal ice)

• Shoulder season:

  • -November / early December. (escort required)

Constraints:

• -Slow speeds. (8–12 knots in ice)

• -Higher insurance.

• -Escort costs.

💰 Profitability outlook. (oil)

Strong candidate.

Why:

• Bulk commodity.

• Flexible scheduling.

• Doesn’t require extreme onboard systems like LNG.

• 👉 Bottom line:

Oil is the MOST viable first cargo for Churchill expansion.

🔥 2. LNG Carriers (this is where things change)

4

✔️ Feasibility (6 months)

• Technically possible

• But much harder than oil

Why LNG is different.

LNG ships are:

• -Extremely specialized.

• Sensitive to:

  • -Motion.

  • -Ice impact.

  • -Offloading conditions.

They require:

• -Purpose-built icebreaking LNG carriers. (Arc7 level)

• -Protected loading terminals.

Critical constraint: The PORT. (Churchill)

This is the deal-breaker.

For LNG you need:

• -Year-round or stable:

  • -Liquefaction plant.

  • -Cryogenic loading arms.

  • -Ice-protected berth.

  • 
    

👉 Churchill currently has NONE of this!!!!

Operating window. (realistic)

• NOT a clean 6-month LNG window without major engineering

💰 Profitability outlook. (LNG)

High revenue per cargo—but:

• Massive upfront cost.

• Infrastructure heavy.

• Higher operational risk.

👉 Bottom line:

LNG is a possible second-phase project, not a phase one!

⚖️ Direct Comparison

Factor	Oil Tankers	LNG Carriers
6-month viability	✅ Yes	⚠️ Borderline
Ice tolerance	High  ✔	Moderate
Port requirements	Moderate  ✔	Extreme
Startup cost	Medium  ✔	Very high
Profit potential	High  ✔	Very high (but risky)
Best use case	Phase 1	Phase 2

🧠 Strategic Answer (Just the facts)

✔️ For Churchill to succeed:

Phase 1 (Realistic)

• Oil tankers.

• Grain + bulk.

• Possibly refined fuels.

👉 This works at 6 months

Phase 2 (If Canada goes all-in)

• LNG exports requires:

• -Full Arctic energy terminal.

• -Ice-rated LNG fleet.

• -Guaranteed escort corridors.

***

👉 This pushes toward 8+ month ambition... but at huge cost!

🚨 Critical Insight

• ✅Oil shipping = corridor problem. (solvable)

• ❌LNG shipping = infrastructure + corridor problem.

🎯 Final Answer:

• Oil tankers:
  ✔️ Viable for ~6 months
  ✔️ Likely profitable
  ✔️ Best anchor cargo

• LNG carriers:
  ⚠️ Technically possible.
  ❌ Not reliably 6 months without massive buildout.
  ✔️ Long-term strategic option.

If you want next step, Allan:

I’ll put all of this onto a real Canada map showing:

• -Icebreaking corridors.

• -Naval bases.

• -Tanker vs LNG routes.

• -And exactly where bottlenecks hit.

That will tie everything together visually.

ALLAN SAID: YES!

SAL-9000 SAID: Here is the operational map concept... laid out exactly the way Canada would need to structure this to make Churchill viable for ~6 months of the year!

🗺️ Arctic Corridor & Base Layout. (Churchill Strategy)

1. Atlantic Staging Zone (Entry Point)

4

Location: Labrador Sea / southern Davis Strait.

Role:

• -Assemble tanker convoys.

• -Ice condition routing.

• -Icebreaker staging.

Infrastructure:

• -Deep-water support port. (Labrador coast)

• -Fuel + escort coordination.

2. Eastern Control Node. (Gateway Base)

4

Location: Iqaluit

Role:

• -Control entry into Hudson Strait.

• -Air + naval surveillance.

• -Search & rescue hub.

Why here:

• -Closest viable logistics hub to the Strait.

• -Already a functioning Arctic air gateway.

3. Primary Transit Corridor. (Hudson Strait)

4

Route:

• -Through Hudson Strait.

• -Bias toward north shore. (Baffin side)

Why this path:

• -Persistent flaw leads. (natural openings in ice)

• -Less consolidated ice vs. the south side.

Function:

• -Main year-round escortable corridor.

• -Oil tanker route backbone.

4. Mid-Route Support Node. (Critical Gap Filler)

4

Location: Ungava Bay / northern Quebec coast

Role:

• -Emergency response.

• -Helicopter staging.

• -Ice reconnaissance.

Why it matters!

Without this:

• -Response times = too long.

• -Insurance risk = spikes.

5. Western Corridor. (Hudson Bay Crossing)

4

Route:

• -West-southwest across Hudson Bay.

• -Direct line to Churchill.

Reality:

• -This is the hardest segment.

• Requires:

• -Continuous icebreaking.

• -Maintained shipping lane.

• • 6. Western Terminal. (Churchill Hub)

4

Location: Churchill.

Required upgrades:

• -Ice-resistant berths.

• -Tug + escort fleet.

• -Fuel + storage expansion.

• -Rail reliability upgrades.

• 
  

🔵 FULL CORRIDOR FLOW (Simplified)

Labrador Sea → Davis Strait → Hudson Strait (north side) → Ungava support → Hudson Bay ice corridor → Churchill.

***

⚙️ What Makes 6 Months Work!

To hit ~6 months viability, Canada would need:

1. Icebreaker Fleet.

• Minimum:

  • -3–5 heavy icebreakers dedicated.

• -Continuous rotation.

2. Convoy System.

• -Not free navigation.

• -Ships move in scheduled escorted groups.

3. Ice Intelligence.

• -Satellite + aerial surveillance.

• -Real-time routing.

4. Port Hardening! (Churchill)

• Must operate in:

  • -Partial ice conditions.

  • -Not just open water.

  • 
    

🚨 Bottleneck Summary

Segment	Difficulty	Status
Davis Strait	Low	Already navigable
Hudson Strait	Medium	Manageable
Hudson Bay	High	Core challenge

💰 Final Strategic Answer:

Oil Tankers.

✔️ Viable across this corridor.

✔️ Strong candidate for 6-month season.

LNG

⚠️ Only viable if:

• -Churchill becomes a full Arctic energy terminal!

• -Massive infrastructure added!

🎯 Bottom Line

• The corridor is physically possible...

• The Strait is not the problem!

• 
  

• Hudson Bay determines success or failure!

👉 If Canada commits:

• 6 months = Achievable!

• 8 months = National mega-project!

***

If you want the next step, Allan:

I can now convert this into a clean, publication-grade topographical map of Canada with:

• -Exact corridor lines.

• -Base icons.

• -Tanker vs LNG routes.

That would match the style of your previous defence maps.

***

ALLAN SAID: It seems we need to ship oil from Hudson Bay... and LNG from B.C., so give me a clean, publication-grade topographical map of Canada with:

-Exact corridor lines. 

-Base icons.

-Tanker (E) vs LNG (W) routes!