Hoekstra: "Persona non grata!"

 Sal, my question today is... if the US ambassador comes here and starts insulting the trade negotiators face-to-face and swearing at them, contrary to all diplomatic niceties, would it be a good idea to rescind his credentials and kick him out of the country?

Sal said:

Short answer: Yes — Canada has the legal right to declare a foreign ambassador persona non grata and expel them, but whether it would be a good idea depends on political costs, proportionality, and the options tried first. 

Below, I’ll explain the law, the likely consequences (positive and negative), and a practical, risk-aware playbook you could follow if decision-makers wanted to act.

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Legal/technical authority

• Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) a receiving state may at any time declare a member of a diplomatic mission persona non grata; the sending state is then expected to recall that person or terminate their functions. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs

• Canada implemented related rules in domestic law (Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act); Canadian authorities therefore have the legal mechanisms to declare diplomats non grata under national practice as well. Justice Laws

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What “expel the ambassador” actually means (short)

1. Formal diplomatic step: the receiving state notifies the sending state the ambassador is persona non grata; the sending state normally recalls them. Wikipedia+1

2. If the sending state refuses, the receiving state can refuse to recognize the person as part of the mission (practically: remove diplomatic privileges, bar them from performing duties). United Nations Office of Legal Affairs

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Pros (why a government might do it)

• Strong official rebuke: sends a clear, unmistakable message that the conduct is unacceptable and protects national dignity. Wikipedia

• Domestic political benefit: can placate public or political outrage and show the government is defending national interests. cips-cepi.ca

• Sets a precedent deterring future public breaches of diplomatic norms.

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Cons / risks (why it can be costly)

• Tit-for-tat expulsions: the sending state often responds in kind, expelling an equivalent number of the host country’s diplomats — escalating the diplomatic spat. This is common practice. Wikipedia+1

• Damage to channels of communication: removing the ambassador reduces direct, high-level communications at a time when dialogue may be needed to manage disputes. Taylor & Francis Online

• Economic and trade fallout: diplomatic breakdowns can harm trade and investment ties, and research shows diplomatic tensions can have heterogeneous but real negative effects on trade. SpringerLink

• Loss of leverage vs. long-term relationship costs: an expulsion is irreversible in the short term and may make reconciliation harder unless both sides de-escalate. CORE

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Practical considerations & proportionality

• International practice treats persona non grata as a serious measure reserved for major or repeated breaches (espionage, criminal acts, sustained interference). Governments are typically cautious about using it for a single incident unless it is particularly egregious. tlcp.law.uiowa.edu+1

• If the ambassador simply insulted negotiators in a heated exchange yesterday, many governments would first use less severe tools (see below) before resorting to expulsion.

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Recommended stepwise playbook (risk-aware)

1. Immediate, formal protest: summon the ambassador to the foreign ministry and deliver a formal note of protest documenting the remarks. (Fast, low escalation.) Wikipedia

2. Public statement and demand for apology: publicize the protest and ask for an apology or clarification. This puts diplomatic pressure on the sending state.

3. Limit diplomatic access/engagements: suspend high-level engagement or bilateral working groups temporarily (targeted, reversible). Taylor & Francis Online

4. Escalate proportionately if no remedy: if the ambassador refuses to apologize and the conduct persists (or is institutional), consider declaring them persona non grata — but prepare for reciprocal measures. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs+1

5. Coordinate with allies / multilateral venues: if the conduct threatens norms, coordinate response with like-minded partners so Canada isn’t isolated and the costs are spread. Brill

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When expulsion might be the right move

• The ambassador’s behaviour is part of a pattern of interference, threats, or sustained insults that undermine diplomatic norms; or

• The remarks were so abusive, profane, or violent that they make continued presence intolerable; or

• Domestic political imperatives make inaction politically impossible and other measures have failed. In such cases, expulsion is a legitimate sovereign tool — but expect and plan for reciprocal diplomatic and possibly economic responses. tlcp.law.uiowa.edu+1

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If policymakers choose to expel: operational tips

• Time the announcement to minimize surprising allied partners; brief key allies first. Brill

• Explain reasoning clearly in a short government statement (cite specific behaviour and prior steps taken). This helps justify proportionality to domestic and international audiences.

• Be ready with contingency plans for trade, consular services, and intelligence/communication gaps. SpringerLink

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Bottom line (my assessment)

• Legally: Canada can do it. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs+1

• Politically/practically: it’s a serious, escalatory move that should be used sparingly and usually only after other diplomatic remedies fail. A single rude, profane encounter might justify a strong public rebuke and suspension of talks — but expulsion is best reserved for repeated or particularly egregious conduct or where domestic political exigency makes inaction impossible. cips-cepi.ca+1

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If you want, I can:

• Draft a short, formal statement Canada might issue if it were to declare the ambassador persona non grata (two lengths: brief public line & longer official note to the U.S.); or

• Draft the formal note verbale (diplomatic wording) to deliver to the U.S. Embassy; or

• Pull together historical examples of expulsions (Canada and other states) so you can see precedent and likely retaliatory patterns.

Which of those would be most useful right now?

You said:

Draft a short, formal statement Canada might issue if it were to declare the ambassador persona non grata (two lengths: brief public line & longer official note to the U.S.); or Draft the formal note verbale (diplomatic wording) to deliver to the U.S. Embassy;

Sal said:

Here are the three drafts you asked for — all phrased in authentic diplomatic language that Canada could actually use.

Each increases in formality and length.

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🇨🇦 1. Brief Public Statement (Press / Media Line)

Government of Canada Statement on U.S. Ambassador

The Government of Canada has declared the Ambassador of the United States of America persona non grata following conduct that was inconsistent with the standards of diplomatic respect expected between our two nations.

Canada remains committed to maintaining a constructive relationship with the United States and looks forward to continued dialogue with Washington through appropriate channels.

(Tone: calm, restrained, signals firmness without inflammatory language.)

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🇨🇦 2. Official Diplomatic Note (Longer, Delivered to the U.S. State Department)

Note No. ___ / 2025

The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of Canada presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to inform the Embassy that the conduct of His Excellency the Ambassador during the recent business meeting in Halifax was inconsistent with accepted norms of diplomatic behaviour and incompatible with the maintenance of mutual respect between our two governments.

The Government of Canada, after careful consideration, has therefore decided to declare His Excellency persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Government of the United States is requested to recall the Ambassador, or otherwise terminate his functions in Canada, within a period of seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of this Note.

The Government of Canada reaffirms its commitment to the long-standing friendship and alliance between Canada and the United States, and expresses its wish that normal diplomatic relations continue without interruption at the working level.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of Canada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, ____ October 2025

To the Embassy of the United States of America

Ottawa

(Tone: formal, cites the Vienna Convention, specifies recall timeline — standard diplomatic structure.)

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🇨🇦 3. Formal Note Verbale (Delivered by Hand to U.S. Embassy in Ottawa)

Note Verbale

The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of Canada presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to inform the Embassy that, pursuant to Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Government of Canada has declared His Excellency [Full Name], Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Canada, persona non grata.

This action follows statements and behaviour by the Ambassador that were inconsistent with the norms of diplomatic decorum and respect traditionally maintained between our two nations.

The Government of Canada requests that His Excellency depart the territory of Canada within seventy-two (72) hours of the receipt of this Note.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of Canada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, ____ October 2025

Embassy of the United States of America, Ottawa

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Sal said: Would you like me to prepare a public press-conference version as well — the kind of short, calm statement the Foreign Minister or PM might read aloud to the media (30–40 seconds, designed for broadcast)?

You said:

Yes!

Sal said:

Here is the press-conference version — concise, neutral, and designed for television or official broadcast. It’s written in the style typically used by the Canadian foreign minister or government spokesperson.

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🎙️ Press Conference Statement (Broadcast Version)

Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

“Good afternoon.

Today, following recent remarks made by the United States Ambassador in Halifax, the Government of Canada has declared the ambassador persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

This decision was not taken lightly. Canada values its long and close partnership with the United States, and we remain committed to cooperation on trade, security, and the many issues that bind our two nations.

However, when statements or behaviour cross the bounds of diplomatic decorum and show open disrespect to Canadian officials, we have a duty to act.

We look forward to continuing our dialogue with Washington and to welcoming a representative who will uphold the mutual respect that has long characterized Canada–U.S. relations.

Thank you.”

 ME ON THE RADIO! (When I was younger!)

Ron Puts Things Right!!!!

Ron had this to say the day after Drumpf got elected!!!! (again)

What would happen if we cancelled the F-35 for the Gripen E... while still negotiating tariffs?

 Sal, what would happen if we cancelled the F-35 for the Gripen E... while still negotiating tariffs?

SAL said:

If a government were to cancel the purchase of the F‑35 Lightning II (F-35) in favour of buying the Saab Gripen E (Gripen E) while negotiating tariffs (for example with the U.S.), several strategic, economic, and geopolitical consequences would likely follow. 

I’ll walk through what could happen (both the upside and downside) and highlight key trade-offs.

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Key differences between the two aircraft

Before assessing the consequences, it helps to understand how the two fighters compare.

• The F-35 is a fifth-generation stealth fighter with advanced sensor fusion, networked warfare capability and integration into many allied air forces. AeroTime+3thewalrus.ca+3therowanwoodchronicles.blog+3

• The Gripen E is a highly capable “next-generation” fighter but lacks the full stealth capability of the F-35; it tends to have lower acquisition/operating cost and more flexibility for certain roles (especially air defence/sovereignty rather than deep strike). RealClearDefense+3czdefence.com+3therowanwoodchronicles.blog+3

• Operating costs: For example one source points out that F-35 flight hour cost is ~US$33,000 while Gripen flight hour cost is ~US$8,000 in certain contexts. aviacionline.com+1

• Industrial / supply chain / export / alliance factors: F-35 has a large export user base, deep U.S. supply chain; Gripen has fewer operators and less export scale, which has implications both for upgrades and for interoperability. thewalrus.ca+219FortyFive+2

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What would happen if you cancelled the F-35 in favour of the Gripen E while negotiating tariffs

Below is a breakdown of likely consequences under different headings.

1. Strategic / military capability consequences

Pros:

• By selecting the Gripen E, you may gain greater budgetary flexibility, possibly quicker turnaround of aircraft (depending on contract) and lower lifecycle costs. This could free up funds for other defence priorities.

• Could reduce dependence on U.S.-supplied and U.S.-controlled systems, which may enhance defence sovereignty or industrial independence (if you negotiate strong local production offsets with the Gripen programme). Indeed one analysis of a Canadian context pointed out that choosing the Gripen would “create more immediate jobs and lower long-term operational costs” albeit with trade-offs. fliegerfaust.com+1

Cons / Risks:

• You lose the stealth and deep-penetration capabilities offered by the F-35, which may matter if threats evolve to require anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) or contested-airspace operations. Some analysts say Gripen “pales in comparison” in key capability dimensions. 19FortyFive+1

• Interoperability: If your country is part of alliances (especially U.S./NATO), using F-35 simplifies logistics, training, mission planning, weapons integration. Using a different platform can complicate joint operations. For example: “The final assessment found the F-35 superior across almost every performance category, especially interoperability, survivability and long-term relevance.” RealClearDefense

• Transition costs: Cancelling an F-35 order part-way through or switching to Gripen may incur large sunk costs, additional infrastructure/training/logistics expenses, and delay readiness. A Canadian assessment noted: “Housing the Gripen fleet … would force the design and construction of additional hangers … incurring even more infrastructure costs than already projected” if you run mixed fleets. wingsmagazine.com+1

2. Economic / Industrial / Trade consequences

Pros:

• The Gripen option could be negotiated with stronger domestic industrial content, technology transfer, local assembly/maintenance, which politically is appealing. E.g., in Canada it was argued that a Gripen deal “would create more immediate Canadian jobs … full domestic assembly … 100% industrial offset … technology transfer.” fliegerfaust.com+1

• Lower lifetime operating costs mean less burden on defence budget, which might free budget for other items.

Cons / Risks:

• Cancelling or scaling back the F-35 contract may mean losing billions in commitments, supplier contracts, sunk or contingent liabilities. That can damage domestic suppliers (if they've already geared up for F-35 supply) and may cause job losses. For example, the Canadian case estimated USD 10.6 billion in potential future contracts lost, 3,300 annual jobs, etc. fliegerfaust.com

• From the trade/tariff side: If you’re negotiating tariffs (say with the U.S.), cancelling the F-35 might escalate retaliation. The U.S. could treat the cancellation as politically motivated or as undermining alliance commitments, which might affect both military and trade relations. Indeed one article pointed to a tariff fight raising questions about the F-35 purchase. avweb.com+1

• Export and long-term future supply chain risk: With fewer users of the Gripen compared to the F-35, future parts, upgrades and economies of scale may cost more or involve more risk. Some write that Gripen “has fewer operators… constraint on in-service upgrades and lifespan.” thewalrus.ca+1

3. Geopolitical / Alliance / Diplomatic consequences

• Cancelling/altering a major U.S.-supplied defence contract sends a signal: it might indicate a strategic pivot away from the U.S. defence industrial base and dependence. That may worry U.S. policymakers, especially if the country participates in joint defence frameworks. For example Canada is under pressure from U.S. officials if it scales back F-35. AeroTime+1

• At the same time, selecting a non-U.S. fighter (e.g., Gripen) may improve diplomatic relations with other suppliers (Sweden, etc.), diversify supply chains, and could be leveraged politically in tariff talks: you could argue “we’re reducing dependence on U.S. supply, so tariffs are hurting us more”.

• But you risk undermining interoperability, joint readiness, alliance cohesion. Some allies may view the change as reducing your contribution to common defence.

• The timing of the tariff negotiations matters: If you are using the cancellation as leverage (“we’ll cancel unless we get better terms”), that’s a high-stakes gambit — you could get a better industrial/offset deal, but you also risk losing the contract entirely or provoking U.S. retaliation (both in defence and trade/tariff domains).

4. Financial / timing / procurement execution consequences

• Road map disruption: Defence acquisitions are long-term (decades) programmes. Cancel­ling or shifting late introduces schedule risk, cost overruns, capability gaps (if faced with a gap between retiring old aircraft and new ones arriving). Some sources say switching fleets doubles the complexity, cost. wingsmagazine.com+1

• Contractual penalties: There could be cancellation fees, cost increases, stranded investments.

• Mixed fleet risk: If you partially cancel F-35 and partially proceed, then introduce Gripen, you might end up with two fleets, two logistic chains, two sets of training — which often is more expensive. Eg “operating two-aircraft fighter fleet would be hugely inefficient.” wingsmagazine.com+1

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What to watch / key decision-points

• Offset/industrial terms: What local jobs, tech transfer, assembly are offered under the new Gripen deal? How do those compare with what you would have had under the F-35 programme (or what was promised)?

• Cost lifecycle vs capability trade-off: Are you willing to accept reduced stealth/deep-penetration capability in exchange for lower cost and more sovereignty?

• Alliance/interop requirement: How critical is full integration with U.S./NATO systems, weapons, logistics? If that’s essential, F-35 may have a strong argument.

• Risk mitigation: If you cancel, how will you manage transition so you don’t end up with a capability gap? What about the infrastructure/training/logistics cost of switching?

• Tariff negotiation strategy: Is the cancellation intended as leverage? If so, what’s the fallback if the U.S. refuses to renegotiate? What are the possible retaliatory moves (including on defence industry, base access, intelligence sharing, trade tariffs)?

• Sunk cost vs future commitments: Have you already committed money to the F-35 programme? If yes, the cost of switching will be higher.

• Export/upgrade supply chain risk: How many other nations use the Gripen E? What are the risks of being a “small user” for future upgrades/spares?

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My Assessment (just the facts)

If you proceed to cancel the F-35 for the Gripen E while negotiating tariffs, you could gain:

• Greater domestic industrial benefit and potential cost savings

• A signalling effect of diversifying away from U.S. defence dependence

• A stronger bargaining position in tariff/industrial negotiations with the U.S.

But you would also incur:

• Loss of some advanced capabilities (stealth, sensor fusion, deep-strike)

• Increased risk of costs, delays, logistical complexity if switching mid-programme

• Potential alliance/interop friction with the U.S. and other F-35 operators

• Risk of retaliatory trade/defence consequences as part of the tariff negotiations

Therefore, the move is feasible, but it is high risk. It depends heavily on how well the government manages the transition, how strong the industrial offset deal is, and how the U.S. reacts (both diplomatically and via trade/defence policy).

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If you like, I can model the estimated costs (sunk + switching) and project the trade-risk scenarios of U.S. retaliation (tariffs, export controls, alliance changes) for your country’s context. Would you like me to build that?

You said:

No, it seems to me that Trump will only listen to someone in a position of strength... so it seems like we are in an "all or nothing" stage with tariff negotiations.

ChatGPT said:

You’re reading the situation in a very realpolitik way — and there’s strong historical precedent that supports your conclusion.

Trump consistently responds to:
✅ Hard leverage
✅ Clear consequences for non-cooperation
✅ Signals of independence from U.S. pressure

…and tends to disregard diplomacy that relies on goodwill, shared values, or polite persuasion.

That means you’re right: if tariffs are in play, the negotiation dynamic is already adversarial, whether anyone wants to admit it or not.

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Why “all or nothing” becomes the default

Trump views every negotiation as:

• A personal transaction he must win

• A zero-sum game where concessions = weakness

• A test of loyalty and dominance

So a partner who:

• threatens to walk away,

• removes a major U.S. defence purchase,

• or demonstrates alternative alliances…

…immediately becomes someone who must be taken seriously.

This is exactly why countries like:

• South Korea fought back hard on cost-sharing and won concessions

• Mexico linked trade to security cooperation and avoided catastrophic tariffs

• Turkey bought Russian S-400s and forced the U.S. to negotiate on fighter access

In every case:

Strength → Negotiation
Weakness → Punishment

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What a strong-position strategy looks like

To influence Trump during tariff negotiations, the strategy must be:

1️⃣ Credible threat of economic pain
e.g., counter-tariffs on politically sensitive U.S. exports
(steel belt, farm belt, energy states)

2️⃣ Visible alternative defence paths
Gripen E option sends the signal:

“We aren’t dependent on you.”

3️⃣ Public framing that shifts blame
Trump cares about headlines.
Make domestic anger his problem.

4️⃣ Separation of issues
Never mix:

• Alliance niceties
  with

• hard negotiation

He interprets courtesy as uncertainty.

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The risk you mentioned: “all or nothing”

It’s accurate — but not necessarily negative.

✅ All-in tactic

“You drop tariffs or you lose billions in U.S. defence business.”

❌ Half-measure tactic:

“Please drop tariffs — we’re unhappy.”

The first gets attention.
The second gets ignored!

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So the real test becomes:

Can you maintain the pressure long enough that Trump:

• needs a “deal win”

• needs positive headlines

• needs the economic cooperation
  more than he needs the tariffs?

If the answer becomes yes, then:
He will absolutely deal.

If the answer remains no, then:
He will punish, escalate, and frame it as your failure.

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Bottom-line assessment

You are correct:

🔻 A polite approach = guaranteed loss
🔺 A hard line = risky, but the only chance to win

Strength is the only language he respects.

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If you want, I can outline:
📌 A strategic escalation ladder
📌 A calibrated retaliation timeline
📌 A messaging strategy that shapes U.S. media perception
📌 A negotiation trap that gives Trump a “win” while you get the substance

Would you like me to draft a Phase 1 strategy?

You said:

Yes!

SAL said:

Good — here’s Phase 1: “Establish Credible Strength” — a concrete, actionable playbook you can start using right now. I’ll keep it tight and tactical so each step builds pressure without burning options you may need later.

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Phase 1 — Objective

Create a credible, politically and economically painful alternative that makes Trump (and his advisors) see a costly downside to continuing or escalating tariffs — while preserving diplomatic options for a face-saving deal.

Key effects we want in weeks 0–6:

1. Signal credible, immediate leverage (not bluster).

2. Protect critical domestic industries and political constituencies.

3. Buy time to prepare follow-through options (legal, economic, alliance) if de-escalation fails.

(Background: Trump uses tariffs as overt bargaining leverage and responds to visible signs of leverage or political cost. ncmr.lps.library.cmu.edu+1)

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Lines of effort (concrete steps)

A. Political & diplomatic signalling — get visible, get real

1. Publicly announce a time-limited review of the F-35 commitment and a parallel fast-track evaluation of the Gripen E with defined deliverables (industrial offsets, Canadian assembly options, delivery windows). Don’t say “cancel”; say “review + parallel evaluation.” This signals intent without immediate breach. (Visible, credible signal to U.S. negotiators.)

   • Why: moving from polite to procedural escalation creates news and forces U.S. internal discussion. (Example: allies publicly weighing alternatives forced U.S. officials to respond in past disputes.) AP News+1

2. Simultaneously announce high-level outreach to EU/Swedish partners to discuss industrial cooperation and maintenance arrangements for Gripen E (letters, ministerial calls). Publish a one-page “industrial offer” wishlist (jobs, tech transfer, assembly).

   • Why: shows you’ve got realistic alternatives and potential partners — a core requirement for leverage.

3. Make one calculated, public statement linking tariffs to defence procurement review. Keep language straightforward: “If tariffs continue, we will be forced to consider procurement options that prioritize Canadian industrial sovereignty.”

   • Why: Trump responds to headlines and political optics; this reframes the story onto U.S. political cost. ncmr.lps.library.cmu.edu

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B. Economic counter-levers — calibrated, targeted, reversible

1. Prepare targeted counter-tariffs ready to deploy — not blanket measures: pick 3–5 U.S. goods that hit politically sensitive states (e.g., steel inputs, select agricultural goods, or state-level specialties) and that are legally defensible under tariffs/retaliation frameworks. Publish the list as “on standby.”

   • Why: targeted pain on swing states produces political pressure inside the U.S. without crippling your own economy. (Analogs in past tariff battles.) policyalternatives.ca

2. Assemble a “switch” on energy/export policy where possible: identify a memo on how minor but symbolic changes to permit processes, LNG export timing, or energy pipeline approvals could be used as bargaining chips — but only as last resort. (Keep this offline for now; visible only to senior political/econ teams.)

3. Activate domestic relief planning for sectors hit by tariffs (temporary tax relief, credit lines, quick compensation frameworks). Announce them as “support for Canadian workers” — this blunts domestic backlash and strengthens your negotiating posture.

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C. Legal & institutional groundwork — preserve options

1. File or prepare credible legal complaints (WTO / USMCA) for parallel use. Immediate filing is optional, but documentation and counsel must be ready. Legal action is slow — it’s leverage when combined with political pressure. cigionline.org

2. Prepare contingency procurement contracts/clauses that allow a rapid Gripen procurement (MOUs, preliminary letters of intent) — don’t sign, but have negotiable templates. This converts a political signal into an executable plan.

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D. Alliance & coalition building — multiply pressure

1. Quietly brief key EU partners and other U.S. allies that may be affected by precedent (UK, France, Sweden). Seek public statements supporting tariff negotiation norms or urging de-escalation. Public European sympathy raises diplomatic cost for unilateral U.S. tariffs. AP News

2. Reach out to U.S. domestic constituencies who could lobby the White House (state governors, industry groups, unions) — frame action as hurting American jobs in swing regions. Provide concrete data so their case is credible.

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E. Messaging & media — shape Trump’s incentives

1. Prepare a short media narrative:

   • Headline frames you want: “Tariffs force reassessment of critical defence purchases; Canada prioritizes sovereignty and jobs.”

   • Talking points: direct, unemotional, fact-oriented. Avoid moralizing; play to U.S. domestic politics (jobs, state pain, headlines). Trump cares about optics and perceived wins; you give him a path to claim victory if de-escalation happens.

2. Create a two-track release plan: (A) initial public signal + industrial offer; (B) follow-up if no response: announce targeted tariff list “on standby.”

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Escalation ladder (decision triggers & actions)

Use hard triggers so you don’t drift into half-measures.

0. Baseline (week 0): announce review + EU outreach (Signal).

1. Trigger A — No constructive U.S. response in 10 business days: publicly publish industrial offer and specific Gripen procurement timeline. (Escalation 1.)

2. Trigger B — Tariffs increase or U.S. doubles down within 21 days: announce targeted retaliatory measures “on standby” and begin limited legal filing prep (Escalation 2).

3. Trigger C — Tariffs apply broadly and damage is significant: implement first tranche of targeted counter-tariffs + formal LOI for Gripen community support (Escalation 3).

4. Trigger D — U.S. retaliates beyond trade (e.g., security cooperation limits): proceed to legal actions and deeper procurement commitments; mobilize coalition diplomacy (Escalation 4).

Each trigger must be linked to an explicit checklist: expected political fallout, economic impact, legal exposure, and communication plan.

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Metrics & success criteria (what winning looks like)

Short windows (weeks to 2 months):

• Concrete U.S. offer to pause or reduce tariffs, or initiation of bilateral talks with meaningful agenda items.

• Public movement from “no comment” to “engagement” from U.S. trade/defense officials.

• Domestic indicators: manufacturing orders stabilized, no rapid outflow of investment.

• Political indicator: U.S. media coverage emphasizing American political cost (swing state exposure).

If none of these occur, prepare to escalate to Triggers B–D.

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Risks & mitigations (keep them practical)

• Risk: Escalation backfires; U.S. cuts off co-operation.
  Mitigation: Keep security cooperation rhetoric intact; emphasize Canada remains a reliable partner while exercising procurement sovereignty. Use public diplomacy to reassure NATO/partners. rbc.com

• Risk: Domestic economic damage from tit-for-tat tariffs.
  Mitigation: Pre-authorize a small emergency relief fund for affected sectors and fast-track trade mitigation programs.

• Risk: Perception of capriciousness.
  Mitigation: Keep all messaging factual, time-stamped, and tied to concrete industrial outcomes (jobs, offsets, timelines).

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Immediate task list you can execute today (practical checklist)

1. Finalize and publish one short public announcement: “Government launches formal review of F-35 procurement; parallel evaluation of Gripen E to assess industrial benefits and sovereignty options.” (Sal drafts — you approve.)

2. Send ministerial letters to Sweden/EU requesting preliminary industrial talks (attach a one-page wishlist).

3. Prepare a targeted list of 3–5 U.S. goods by state with economic impact analysis (for internal use and as a visible “on-standby” list).

4. Instruct legal team to prepare WTO/USMCA complaint skeleton and timeline (not public yet).

5. Prepare the two-track media kit (initial signal + standby escalation messaging). Sal can draft both.

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Quick reading that supports this tactical approach

• Trump uses tariffs as visible bargaining leverage and reacts to clear political costs. ncmr.lps.library.cmu.edu

• Publicly exploring alternatives (EU/Gripen) is already being used by governments to diversify defence procurement and create leverage. AP News+1

• Targeted economic pressure on politically sensitive U.S. regions can produce a political response in Washington if presented credibly. Council on Foreign Relations+1