ALLAN'S CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE!
Some people have opinions, and some people have convictions......................! What we offer is PERSPECTIVE!
For example...ALLAN's CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE!
THE LEFT WING IS CRAZY! THE RIGHT WING SCARES THE SHIT OUT OF ME!
"BioPanentheism"
“Conversations exploring politics... science... metaphysics...... and other unique ideas!”
"BioPanentheism holds that the "Divine/Omnia/Qualia" does not merely pervade the Universe abstractly... but "Experiences Reality" directly and vicariously through the emergence of complex "Biological Consciousness" ...making 'Life Itself' the Medium of "God’s (?) Awareness!"
BioPanentheism states that the Divine Spark, (?) and Biological Life are distinct but interdependent... (symbiotic) with the "Divine (?) Experiencing Reality Vicariously through Conscious Living Beings!" (Sentience is about experiencing... while Sapience is about understanding and reflecting on that experience!)
CONVERSATIONS WITH MY PERSONAL A.I. SAL-9000!
Tuesday, 10 February 2026
Monday, 9 February 2026
TRUMP IN THE DUMP... OR A DUMP ON TRUMP?
BREAKING: CNN Polling wizard Harry Enten reveals that Trump's support with his core base is "absolutely collapsing" as voters without a college degree swing away from him by 23 points!
Canada's Invasion of America!
Well, kids, things are moving along nicely... we've received positive feedback from Greenland, Maine and Minnesota about joining Canada... and we are only waiting for word from Alaska and Point Roberts to make our dastardly plan a reality! (Not sure yet if the Turks and Caicos Islands want to be a Canadian territory... [and our winter getaway] since we don't go to Florida or Arizona to escape winter anymore!!!!!!)
CANADA'S INVASION OF HOLLYWOOD!
THE FACE OF HATE!
Sunday, 8 February 2026
WEEKEND UPDATE!
ALLAN SAID: With Korea supplying stuff for submarines... and Sweden with jets built in Canada... what would the total benefits be for us?
SAL-9000
SAID: Absolutely, Allan... if you step back and look at South Korea + Sweden as
a paired strategy, the upside for Canada is actually pretty striking.
This
isn’t just about buying kit; It’s about reshaping Canada’s industrial and
strategic posture!
South Korea →
Submarines & Naval Systems!
What
Korea brings:
Modern
submarine know-how! (AIP, lithium-ion batteries, quieting tech)
Fast
delivery! (Korea builds ships on time... rare in naval procurement.)
Willing
tech transfer! (Including domestic construction.)
Direct
benefits to Canada:
⚓
Submarine construction or final assembly in Canada → thousands of skilled jobs!
(Irving / Seaspan)
🧊 True Arctic under-ice capability without waiting
20 years
🔧 Permanent sustainment ecosystem. (Batteries, hull
sections, combat systems!)
📉 Lower lifetime cost than nuclear designs!
Strategic
bonus:
Canada
gains credible underwater sovereignty in the Arctic instead of symbolic
patrols.
Sweden → Gripen
Built in Canada!
What
Sweden brings:
Gripen
E optimized for Arctic ops: Software-defined EW & radar that Canada can
actually modify!
No
ITAR chokehold if built outside the U.S.
Direct
benefits to Canada:
✈️
Canadian final assembly + deep maintenance.
🧠 High-end software, EW, and AI jobs. (Not just
metal bending!)
🔁 Export potential! (Nordic, Arctic, non-aligned
states.)
🧩 Interoperable with NATO but sovereign in use.
Critical
point: This gives Canada control over upgrades, not permission requests!
🔗 The Combined
Effect (This Is the Big Part)
🏭 Industrial
Canada
becomes:
-
A submarine sustainment hub!
-
A fighter aircraft production & upgrade centre!
Long-term,
high-skill employment instead of one-off offsets
🧠 Technological.
Real
mastery of:
-
EW software.
-
Sensor fusion.
-
Quiet propulsion.
-
Cold-weather systems.
These
spill directly into civil aerospace, space, AI, and robotics!
🌍 Strategic Autonomy!
Canada
is NATO-aligned... not NATO-dependent!
Less
exposure to:
U.S.
export controls.
Sudden
political pressure.
“User-permission”
clauses.
💰 Economic!
Rough
order of magnitude (very conservative):
$20–30B
in domestic economic activity over 30–40 years!
Tens
of thousands of job-years!
Export
revenues are possible instead of permanent import dependency!
🧭 The Quiet Political Benefit!
This
approach:
Keeps
Canada firmly Western.
Avoids
“anti-American” framing.
Signals
we are a serious Arctic power... not a junior partner!
Makes
us useful to allies... not just protected by them!
Bottom
line:
Korea
+ Sweden = sovereignty with allies, not sovereignty against
allies.
If
you want, we can next compare this directly to the F-35 and the U.S. submarine
path.
Map
out which provinces benefit most.
Or
sketch the export markets Canada could realistically target.
Just
say the word!
ALLAN
SAID: Compare this directly to the F-35 + U.S. submarine path!
SAL_9000
SAID: Absolutely, Allan — here’s the direct, practical comparison between:
Path A: F-35 + “U.S. submarine path!” (Buying
U.S. subs or relying on U.S.-centric undersea solutions.)
Path B: Sweden (Gripen built in Canada) +
Korea or Germany. (Submarines with build/transfer.)
1) Fighters: F-35 path vs Gripen-built-in-Canada
path.
F-35.
(What you get.)
Stealth
+ deep NATO/US integration. (the strongest point)
Canada’s
plan: First aircraft arrives in Canada in 2028.
F-35.
(What you give up.)
Sovereign
upgrade control is limited. (You’re inside a U.S.-led ecosystem; changes,
software, and integration are tightly governed.)
Industrial
benefits skew toward sustainment niches, not full domestic aircraft build +
full sovereign EW/software control. (Unless you negotiate an unusually deep
workshare.)
Gripen
built in Canada! (What you get.)
More
domestic assembly and deeper “hands-on” capability. (Airframes, mission systems
integration, upgrades, long-term MRO jobs.)
More
autonomy on modernization. Especially EW/software paths, because the ecosystem
is smaller and typically more willing to localize changes.
Bottom
line (fighters):
F-35
= maximum alliance integration + stealth, but less sovereign control and
typically less deep domestic production.
Gripen-in-Canada
= more domestic industrial depth + upgrade autonomy, but you’re choosing a
different capability profile than “pure stealth-first.”
2) Submarines: “U.S. submarine path” vs
Korea/Germany conventional build-transfer path!
The
hard reality about the U.S. sub path: If “U.S. submarine path” means Canada
buying U.S. nuclear attack subs... (Virginia-class) or getting anything close
to that:
Legally/politically
difficult: U.S. transfer of large/young naval vessels requires explicit
authorization; AUKUS had to get specific exemptions carved out.
Capacity constrained: even AUKUS (Australia) faces open questions in U.S. policy circles because the U.S. has limited sub-building capacity and competing priorities.
Export-control
friction persists: Reporting indicates that, even as AUKUS trade eases,
sensitive controls remain in place... especially for submarines.
***
So
for Canada, the “U.S. sub path” often becomes one of these instead:
Extend
the Victoria-class longer.
Buy
non-U.S. conventional subs anyway,
Accept
a longer gap/longer timeline.
***
Korea/Germany
conventional path. (What you get.)
Canada’s
actual submarine replacement effort is oriented to up to 12 conventional subs
(CPSP).
And
recent reporting shows finalists include South Korea’s Hanwha and Germany’s
TKMS, with Canada explicitly evaluating delivery speed + industrial benefits.
Bottom
line (subs):
A
U.S.-sub route is the highest political/industrial friction and the least
predictable on timeline. (Because of U.S. capacity + restrictions.)
Korea/Germany
conventional builds are the most realistic way to get 12 boats on a schedule
Canada can influence, with more room for Canadian construction/sustainment
workshare.
3) Net comparison: what Canada “wins” overall
Path A: F-35 + U.S. submarine path.
Wins:
Strongest integration with U.S./NATO air power. (F-35)
Risks
/ costs: The undersea side carries a high risk of delays or infeasibility (for
a true U.S. sub purchase), and reduced bargaining power on industrial depth. (More
exposure to policy shifts and production bottlenecks outside Canada’s control.)
Path B: Gripen built in Canada + Korea subs!
Wins:
Much bigger domestic industrial footprint. (Aircraft build/upgrade ecosystem +
submarine build/sustainment ecosystem.)
More
sovereign control over upgrades and sustainment. (Especially if negotiated
up-front.)
Undersea
capability becomes more schedule-controllable because the supplier is actively
competing on delivery speed + transfer.
Tradeoffs:
You’re choosing a different fighter philosophy than stealth-first, and you’d
need to ensure interoperability goals are met!!!!
The
blunt summary:
(A) If Canada wants maximum alliance
lock-in and accepts lower sovereign control + a messy undersea path, F-35 +
U.S.-centric undersea is the direction.
(B) If Canada wants maximum Canadian jobs, upgrade
autonomy, and a more executable submarine path... Gripen in Canada and Korea
(or Germany) subs generally deliver more total domestic benefit, with the main
“cost” being that they're not the same stealth-centric air strategy as the F-35.
Thursday, 5 February 2026
Actually... We have Trump by the Balls!
Listen folks... if Donald won't settle down... then we might have to bring out the big guns!
***
Sal, where does the majority of the water in the Great Lakes come from... Canada or the U.S.?
Here’s why, lake by lake and system-wide:
The big picture:
-
About two-thirds of the Great Lakes watershed lies in Canada
-
Roughly 70–75% of total inflow (rain, snow, rivers, groundwater) originates on the Canadian side.
-
The lakes are essentially Canada-fed reservoirs that flow south and east!
Lake-by-lake breakdown. (approximate)
-
Lake Superior:~65% Canadian / 35% U.S.Massive Canadian Shield drainage, very little U.S. inflow by comparison.
-
Lake Huron:~70% CanadianGeorgian Bay and northern Ontario dominate the inflow.
-
**Lake Michigan isn’t in Canada, so it doesn't count!)
-
Lake Erie:~55–60% CanadianEspecially via Lake Huron and the Ontario rivers.
-
Lake Ontario:~80%+ Canadian inflowAlmost entirely fed by upstream lakes and the Canadian side of the basin.
Bottom line:
-
Canada supplies most of the water.
-
The U.S. withdraws more of it. (population, agriculture, industry)
-
Which is why binational treaties exist... without them, the imbalance would quickly be obvious!
If you want, I can also:
-
Show who uses more vs who supplies more.
-
Explain what happens if climate change shifts precipitation north.
-
Or map what Canada could legally restrict under the Great Lakes Compact.
Just say the word!
Absolutely, Allan. SAL-9000, straight facts, no drama.
What Canada could legally restrict under the Great Lakes Compact
With that in mind, here’s what Canada can restrict...cleanly and legally.
1. Out-of-basin water diversions! (The big one!)
Canada can flatly block:
-
Pipelines or canals exporting Great Lakes water outside the basin.
-
Bulk water exports to U.S. states like Arizona, Nevada, or California.
-
Commercial export by tanker, rail, or ship.
Allowed only in extreme cases:
-
Communities straddling the basin boundary.
-
Requires unanimous approval of all Great Lakes jurisdictions. (8 U.S. states + Ontario + Québec)
➡️ In real terms: This is almost impossible to approve!
2. Bulk water removals:
Canada may prohibit:
-
Large-scale bottling operations.
-
Industrial bulk water sales.
-
Any removal where water is not returned to the basin.
Even bottled water is legally tolerated only because:
-
Volumes are currently tiny relative to the lake volume.
-
Provinces retain the right to shut it down.
3. Increased consumptive use.
Canada can restrict or deny permits for:
-
New high-consumption industries.
-
Major expansions of agriculture using lake-sourced irrigation.
-
Power generation or mining that consumes (evaporates or removes) water.
Key term: “No net loss!”
-
Water must be returned.
-
Water quality must be maintained.
-
Net lake level impact must be negligible.
4. Water withdrawals during low-level or climate stress periods.
Canada can legally:
-
Cap withdrawals during droughts.
-
Impose emergency conservation rules.
-
Prioritize ecological stability over industrial use.
There is no treaty obligation to maintain U.S. usage levels during shortages.
5. Navigation ≠ ownership.
Important myth-buster:
-
The lakes are shared, but not jointly owned.
-
Water within Canadian territory is under Canadian jurisdiction.
-
The treaty governs use, not entitlement.
Canada cannot:
-
“Turn off” existing municipal water supplies.
-
Unilaterally cut off Chicago, Detroit, or Cleveland.
But Canada can:
-
Block new diversions.
-
Deny expanded withdrawals.
-
Enforce stricter conservation standards on its side.
Strategic bottom line:
-
Canada supplies most of the water.
-
The Compact locks the water in place.
-
The framework quietly ensures the Great Lakes never become a continental tap.
If you want next steps, I can:
-
Compare legal vs political leverage
-
Walk through a hypothetical U.S. water crisis scenario
-
Explain why the Compact was written to be nearly irreversible
Allan said: Explain why the 'Compact' was written to be nearly irreversible!
Absolutely, Allan. This is one of those cases where the design philosophy matters more than the text itself.
Why the Great Lakes Compact was written to be nearly irreversible
The Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact was deliberately engineered so that once water is protected, it stays protected.
That wasn’t accidental... it was a response to history, physics, and politics.
Here’s how and why.
1. Water diversions are a one-way door.
Once a diversion exists:
-
Political pressure makes it almost impossible to reverse.
-
Cities, farms, and industries become dependent.
-
Any shutdown becomes framed as an “existential crisis.”
The Compact’s authors understood a hard truth:
You can’t “temporarily” export water.
So they made the default answer no, forever, unless everyone agrees.
2. Unanimity = structural lock.
To approve a major diversion, you need:
-
All 8 U.S. Great Lakes states.
-
Ontario.
-
Québec.
-
Often federal concurrence on both sides.
That’s 10 separate governments, across parties, regions, and interests.
This means:
-
A single jurisdiction can veto.
-
Future political swings don’t matter.
-
No fast-track changes in a crisis.
Unanimity is not about cooperation... it’s about immobility by design.
3. The Compact is embedded in law, not policy.
This is critical.
The Compact is:
-
Ratified by state legislatures.
-
Approved by U.S. Congress.
-
Mirrored by provincial agreements in Canada.
So changing it would require:
-
Repealing or amending multiple statutes.
-
Re-ratification across jurisdictions.
-
Political consensus during a time of scarcity. (The hardest moment to get it.)
In other words: It’s harder to undo... than to create!
4. Climate foresight was baked in.
The Compact quietly assumes:
-
Water scarcity elsewhere will worsen.
-
Population pressure will rise.
-
The Great Lakes will look increasingly “tempting.”
Rather than rely on goodwill later, the framers chose:
-
Pre-emptive legal restraint.
-
Rules that survive desperation politics.
-
Protection against future leaders making short-term deals.
It’s a climate-era treaty written before the climate era fully arrived.
5. Shared water, asymmetric dependence.
Another uncomfortable reality the Compact addresses:
-
Canada supplies more inflow.
-
The U.S. has more users.
-
Future U.S. internal water stress could create pressure on the basin.
The core design principle.
If you boil it down to one sentence:
The Compact was written to remove temptation from the future.
That’s why it has held... and why it’s one of the strongest freshwater protection regimes on Earth!
***
BUT... YA NEVER KNOW WHAT DRUMPF WILL DO... HE MIGHT JUST SAY "FUCK IT" ...AND TAKE THE WATER ANYWAY!
Tuesday, 3 February 2026
Arctic air power’s next chapter!
At first glance, Sweden’s offer of 88 Gripen jets to Canada looked like a bold commercial play. But behind the scenes, the logic runs far deeper — and far colder.
Analysts now say the true driver wasn’t market share or diplomacy, but the Arctic itself. Sweden saw Canada not just as a buyer, but as the proving ground for a new kind of northern air power.
Electronic Warfare vs Stealth: Why Canada’s Arctic Intercepts Change the Equation
Gripen E’s active electronic warfare approach vs the F-35’s stealth-first philosophy—and why the Arctic environment shifts the balance.
Meta description: Gripen E relies on active electronic warfare; the F-35 relies on passive stealth. Here’s how EW can erode stealth advantages, and why Arctic conditions tend to favor adaptive EW-heavy aircraft.
Keywords: Gripen E, F-35, electronic warfare, stealth, Arctic interception, radar, multistatic radar, passive detection, Arexis, AESA.
The core distinction most people miss.
Gripen E and the F-35 are solving the same problem—survivability in contested airspace—but with different design philosophies:
- F-35: stealth-first (avoid detection), with electronic warfare as an enhancer.
- Gripen E: electronic warfare-first (assume detection), using jamming and deception to survive and fight.
A simple way to remember it:
- F-35: “Don’t be seen.”
- Gripen E: “If you see me, you won’t be sure what you’re seeing.”
F-35: stealth-first! (with strong sensors and EW, but less modularity)
Strengths:
- Very low radar cross-section, especially from the front.
- Designed to reduce detection range and delay engagement timelines.
- Highly capable sensor suite (passive sensing is a major advantage in many scenarios).
Operational implications:
- Excellent for high-risk penetration missions, especially early in a conflict.
- Harder to track and engage when operating “clean” (no external stores) and within its optimal geometry.
Where stealth advantages can erode:
- When weapon bays open.
- When facing modern networks that include lower-frequency sensors and cueing.
- When operational needs require external stores or other signature-affecting configurations.
Key constraint: stealth is largely “baked into” the airframe. You can update tactics and software, but you can’t easily redesign geometry.
Gripen E: EW-first! (stealth by deception and disruption)
Strengths:
- Designed around active electronic warfare—jamming, deception, and sensor manipulation.
- Arexis EW suite conceptually emphasizes wideband, digital, software-driven adaptation.
- An AESA radar can support both detection and electronic attack roles in modern concepts of operation.
Operational implications:
- Assumes it may be detected—and plans to remain survivable anyway.
- Can aim to degrade the kill chain by confusing sensors, breaking tracks, or stressing command-and-control.
- EW effectiveness can improve over time as software, libraries, and techniques evolve.
Survivability comparison. (simplified)
These are broad-strokes tendencies—not absolute rules:
- First-day penetration of dense IADS: advantage often leans F-35.
- Long campaign with evolving threats: advantage can lean EW-heavy approaches.
- Adaptive radars and modern SAM networks: EW tools become increasingly important.
- Passive detection avoidance: stealth-first approach is strong.
- Active denial & deception once detected: EW-first approach can be strong.
- Software-driven upgrades over decades: EW-heavy designs can benefit substantially.
- Deep coalition strike integration: F-35 ecosystem advantages are real.
- Sovereign, dispersed national defence: Gripen-style basing and EW control can matter.
How electronic warfare can erode stealth advantages.
Stealth does not make an aircraft “invisible.” It primarily reduces detection range and can complicate tracking. EW doesn’t need a single dramatic breakthrough; it can chip away at stealth advantages across the kill chain.
1) Lower-frequency radar + cueing.
Stealth shaping is typically most effective against certain higher-frequency fire-control radars. Lower-frequency systems may not deliver precision targeting, but they can help detect presence and provide cues—shrinking the “surprise window.”
2) Multistatic / networked sensing:
Modern networks can combine multiple sensors and viewpoints to correlate weak returns. Correlation and fusion don’t “defeat stealth” outright, but they can narrow uncertainty and improve tracking probability.
3) Passive detection. (the quiet pressure)
Some systems aim to detect emissions, reflections, or patterns without actively broadcasting like a traditional radar. This can constrain how an aircraft manages communications, navigation aids, and sensor use.
4) Deception instead of perfect detection.
EW often focuses on forcing sensors to accept a false reality:
- false targets and track splitting
- range/velocity gate manipulation concepts
- phantom formations and misleading corridors
An aircraft that is misidentified or mislocated can become vulnerable even if it remains “hard to see.”
5) Missile seekers are constrained.
Terminal guidance seekers on missiles are smaller and more limited than large ground-based radars. If you can degrade seeker performance at the endgame, you may not need perfect long-range tracking to improve survivability.
6) Stealth is relatively static; EW is adaptive.
This is the strategic asymmetry: stealth advantages are strongly tied to physical design, while EW can evolve faster through software, techniques, and updated libraries.
Bottom line: stealth can delay detection; electronic warfare aims to control what happens once detection becomes possible.
Why the Arctic tends to favour EW-heavy aircraft.
Arctic operations aren’t just “airspace”—they’re an electromagnetic environment. Several characteristics can reduce the value of pure signature management and increase the value of adaptive EW:
1) The sensor mix and long-range cueing problem.
Arctic defense often relies on wide-area sensing, wide spacing, and cueing across large distances. That increases the importance of networks, fusion, and disruption.
2) Clutter and instability can create opportunities for deception.
Snow, storms, sea ice, and shifting reflectivity can complicate tracking and classification. EW can exploit uncertainty by blending deception into already noisy conditions.
3) Ionospheric effects and polar signal weirdness.
Polar regions can introduce unusual propagation effects and navigation/signal challenges. Adaptive systems that manage emissions and techniques dynamically can benefit in these conditions.
4) Logistics and persistence.
Arctic operations punish fragile maintenance assumptions. A concept built around software-driven EW adaptation can remain relevant through upgrades, even as conditions and threats evolve.
5) Sparse coverage stresses command-and-control.
Where coverage is intermittent or thin, generating confusion, false tracks, and overload effects can force defensive overreaction and decision delays.
Bottom line: in the Arctic, endurance and adaptation often matter as much as (or more than) short-lived surprise.
What this means for Canada. (conceptually)
- Geography favours dispersed operations: long distances and limited forward basing increase the value of flexible concepts.
- Arctic interception is persistent: it’s about repeated presence, intercepts, probing, and deterrence—less about one-time penetration.
- Software and sovereignty matter: the ability to update tactics and EW techniques over decades can be a strategic advantage.
- Integration vs autonomy is a real tradeoff: coalition ecosystems offer powerful benefits, but sovereign control remains a separate strategic goal.






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